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The ethics of diagnosis amalgamates twenty-one papers on the history, philosophy and socio-
anthropology of medical diagnosis that were presented at conferences in Madrid (1979) and West
Berlin (1989). The papers in the sections classified as anthropological, socio-cultural, and post-
modem, reiterate a single message in various scholarly vemaculars: that the purposes, interests and
values of society, of physicians, and ofpatients, necessarily inform supposedly "objective" diagnoses.
Many of the contributors take this observation to be tantamount to the claim that there is an "ethical
dimension" to all diagnosis. It is a truism that ethics involve values, but it is false that all values are
ethical (values in art, for example, seem irrelevant to ethics). Moreover, as philosopher Stuart Spicker
argues, if one is careful to differentiate diagnosis from treatment, most ethical questions seem to be
posed by treatment decisions, not by diagnoses. Spicker goes on to observe, however, that the
diagnostic process itself can generate ethical issues because, in so far as the process of diagnosing
involves communicating a diagnosis to a patient, or to people engaged in patient care, it redefines
the patient and thereby affects her or his sense of self. The fiduciary relationship between physician
and patient thus creates an ethic of diagnosis: specifically a duty to tell patients the truth about their
condition in a way that recognizes and respects patients' personhood, a duty which Spicker calls
"trust-telling".
There are other perceptive papers in this volume, especially in the section on computer assisted
diagnosis, however, I will discuss only papers in the Historical Perspectives section. In 'The ethics of
diagnosis in ancient Greek medicine', Lain-Entralgo argues that "diagnosis" is an artifact of
Hippocratic medicine, a form of healing in which: (1) the healer distanced himself from the sick
person, whose body (2) was thought to have a dysfunction which (3) was undeserved. Hippocratic
medicine did more than invent the idea ofdiagnosis, it also devised an explicit ethic regulating the use
of diagnosis. As Spicker suspected, diagnosis was seen as morally problematic in the context of
prognosing, that is when physicians distinguished between curable and incurable conditions. Insofar as
the patient is incurable, "art can do nothing" (Oni the art VI, 2) and so the physician had a duty to
refrain from treating and from charging for treatment. Culpability arose "if the physician .. does not
know his illness", but nonetheless, pronounced curable a "patient who is overcome by [illness]", for
then "the physician is to blame" (On affections VI, 220). Lain-Entralgo concludes by analysing
"blame" in Greek "shame-culture"-an analysis which, unfortunately, is obscured by a typographical
error that has him discussing "same-culture".
In 'The ethics of diagnosis in early Christianity and the Middle Ages', Diego Gracia distinguishes
between the "etiological diagnosis" found in ethico-religious accounts of illness and true medical
diagnosis discovered by the Hippocratics. The former involves concepts of moral transgression and/or
impurity and "is carried out by means of a systematic inquiry into the moral precept that has been
transgressed" (p. 19). Garcia argues that in the Christian tradition it is Jesus himself who rejects the
ethico-religious account of illness. In John 9:1-3 Jesus is asked: "Rabbi, who hath sinned, this man or
his parents, that he should be born blind?" Jesus replies: "Neither hath this man sinned, nor his parents,
but that the works ofGod should be made manifest in him." Thus, Garcia argues, "the ill person is not
looked upon as an impure being that must be excluded from the cultural and social community, but as a
privileged place or object for the salvific work ofGod" (p. 20). The example ofJesus was emulated in
the early Christian and Medieval world, which readily assimilated, even as it transmuted, the
Hippocratic medicine ofthe Greeks and the accompanying ethics ofdiagnosis. In the rest ofthe essay
Garcia outlines the changes Christianity wrought in the Hippocratic ethic of diagnosis. He also
advances the intriguing hypothesis that Judaeo-Christian physicians sought to elevate the status of the
Hippocratic Oath as a way of distancing themselves from the secular shame-morality integral to
Hippocratic medicine in the ancient world.
Augustfn Albarracin's, 'The ethics ofdiagnosis in the modern and contemporary worlds', attempts
to trace the ethics of diagnosis from the sixteenth through to the eighteenth centuries. He also
"corrects" standard accounts ofthe history ofmedical ethics. Unhappily, in doing so he loses the focus
on diagnosis (the unique contribution of this volume) and disseminates misinformation. Thus he
challenges Donald Konold, Jeffrey Berlant and others "who hold the first code ofethics to be the work
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of Thomas Percival". "There is", he informs us, "evidence to the contrary. In 1772... John
Gregory ... published... on . . . physicians' . . . duties" (p. 36). The error is Albarracin's: Gregory
does indeed discuss the duties of physicians earlier than Percival, but not in the distinctive form of a
code. The code format-a numbered compilation of moral rules of conduct-was introduced into
English-language medical ethics by Percival. Here, for example, is an excerpt from Percival's Rule
I1.3, which deals with the ethics of diagnosing "incurable" conditions: "A physician should not be
forward to make gloomy prognostications ... by magnifying the importance of his services in the
treatment or cure of the disease. But he should not fail ... to give to the friends ofthe patient, timely
notice of danger... and even to the patient himself, if absolutely necessary.... For the physician
should be minister of hope and comfort to the sick; that by such cordials to the drooping spirit, he may
smooth the bed ofdeath." It is a pity that Albarracin chose to engage in spurious scholarship instead of
analysing what Gregory and Percival actually said about the ethics of diagnosis.
Darrel Amundsen's 'Some conceptual and methodological observations on the history and ethics of
diagnosis' demonstrates the dangers ofattempting to practise history apriori. Noting that "the ethics of
diagnosis has not yet been isolated for special scrutiny as a circumscribed ethical category" in standard
works on medical ethics, Amundsen asks "How . . . may the historian construct ameaningful history of
ethics of diagnosis?" (p. 49). After a protracted analysis he hedges, but is essentially sceptical. He is
misled, in part, by the expectation that diagnosis must deal with discrete diseases (as it has since the
nineteenth century) rather than conditions (the norm from the Hippocratics through Percival). He is
also deceived by the strong association between ethics and therapeutics in modem medicine. Knowing
that, before the nineteenth century, medicine de-emphasized therapeutics and lacked a nosology with
clearly delineated diseases, Amundsen is sceptical about the very possibility of a history of the ethics
of diagnosis, a priori. In striking contrast, Lain-Entralgo approaches the question a posteriori. By
re-examining the Hippocratic corpus he discovers injunctions governing diagnosis in the context of
prognosis-and thereby uncovers an ethic that, as the rule from Percival's Medical ethics cited above
illustrates, was still important in the early nineteenth century. The moral ofthis tale is that the history
of medical ethics is a branch of history; it is thus inextricably wedded to empirical evidence- and
even sceptical theories must be validated by such evidence.
These five mini-reviews should give the reader a sense of this volume. Its primary value is
innovation: it is the first systematic exploration of the ethics of diagnosis. Some contributors were
unequal to the task; others developed a conceptual framework for analysing an ethic of diagnosis and
have begun to chart its history. Their work should assure The ethics ofdiagnosis a place on the shelves
of any library seriously interested in medical ethics and/or the history of medicine.
Robert Baker, Union College, Schenectady
JAN GOLINSKI, Science as public culture: chemistry and Enlightenment in Britain, 1760-1820,
Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. xii, 342, £32.50, $54.95 (0-521-39414-7).
Theperiod from 1760 to 1820 was one ofimmense political and social turmoil in Europe. It was also
one in which the science of chemistry underwent a transformation so profound that the phrase
"chemical revolution" is not wholly inappropriate. In his ambitious book Jan Golinski takes a new look
at British chemistry in this tumultuous era, particularly in relation to its public audience. Scotland
receives one chapter, but the spotlight is chiefly on the English workers Joseph Priestley, Thomas
Beddoes and Humphry Davy. Some new material is presented and use is made of much recent
scholarship. With the aid of meticulous research, backed by careful documentation, the author has
disclosed many hitherto unrecognised features ofthe scientific scene around 1800. Those interested in
the history of medicine will find much of value in the accounts ofpneumatic medicine, ranging from
early experiments with nitrous oxide that did not acknowledge its analgesic potential (Beddoes and
Davy) to the allegedly antiscorbutic properties of soda-water (Priestley and his successors).
The author claims that his approach is "sociological rather than conceptual, rhetorical rather than
philosophical" (p. 66). This (together with the title) may alarm those aware of the limitations and
hazards of such an approach, where so-called sociological insights into science may be unacceptably
reductionist, self-contradictory, completely unverifiable or merely complicated ways of stating the
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